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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ENTRY OF JUDGMENT [WITHOUT A HEARING
ON DAMAGES VIOLATED ARGONAUT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
This case revolves around the payment of workers' compensation benefits to an

injured employee. However, the party found liable to pay the benefits has been deprived of
every substantive and procedural right given it to ensure that the benefits due are reasonable
and necessary. First, the Labor Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine workers'
compensation benefits. The trial court was to consider only coverage issues. Also,
Argonaut's due process rights guaranteed by the Utah2 and United States Constitutions3 were
violated. Because the trial court refused to hold a hearing to determine damages, Argonaut
was deprived of its property unlawfully. The trial court accepted WCF's bald assertions of
damages. The actions of the trial court constitute an egregiqus and obvious violation of
Argonaut's due process rights.
A.

The Labor Commission has Exclusive Jurisdiction

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(l l)(a) (West 2002) provides that "the commission has
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine whether the treatment or services rendered to
employees by physicians, surgeons, or other health providers are: (i) reasonably related to
industrial injuries ... and (ii) compensable pursuant to this chapter ....'
The statute speaks for itself.

2
3

See Utah Constitution Article I § 7.
See U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV § 1.
1

B.

Due Process Requires a Hearing Before an Individual is Deprived of a
Property Interest

The United States Supreme Court "consistently has held that some form of hearing
is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest."4 Argonaut was not
given any form of hearing and was not provided an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time or in a meaningful manner.5 The trial court abused its discretion when it entered
judgment without a hearing. The trial court finally deprived Argonaut of a property interest
without allowing Argonaut any opportunity to defend itself.
On remand, the trial court was to enter an opinion consistent with Workers'
Compensation Fund v. Wadman Corp, 2009 UT 18, 210 P.3d 277.6 In Wadman, this Court
found that Wadman Corporation ("Wadman Corp.") was the statutory employer of Mr.
Searle.7 On remand, the proper action for the trial court would be to enter declaratory
judgment identifying Wadman Corp. as the statutory employer, and then transfer the case to
the Labor Commission to determine the benefits due to Mr. Searle. The trial court mentioned

"Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 557-558 (1974), Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589,596597(1931)
5

See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 ("The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" (internal citations
omitted)).
6

&eR. 1313

"Id.
2

this in its judgment,8 but failed to transfer the case. At the ver^ least, the trial court should
have held a hearing to determine the amount of damages.
Because the trial court did not transfer the case to the lLabor Commission or hold a
hearing on damages, Argonaut was deprived of its property interest without due process of
law. The trial court entered judgment based on cursory computer printouts without any
foundation or authentication.9 Rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires that evidence
be properly authenticated and identified before it is admitted inio evidence.10 The trial court
erroneously based its judgment on evidence that had not been properly authenticated in direct
violation of this rule. Argonaut was never provided an opportunity to conduct discovery
relating to damages, cross-examine any witnesses, or defend itself in any way with regards
to WCF's claim to damages. The trial court simply accepted WCF's claim of damages and
did not require it to meet any burden of proof or evidentiary requirements. The trial court's
actions were error.
C.

The Trial Court Never Received Supporting documentation for WCF's
Claim for Damages

WCF claims that Argonaut's due process rights were not violated because WCF sent
Argonaut a copy of the proposed judgment with a "disc containing all the necessary

8

R. 1481.

9

R. 1514 and 1518.

l0

See Utah Rules of Evidence 901(a) and State v. Hortdn. 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah
App. 1993).

foundational documents to support the amount of damages ...."ll WCF also claims that
Argonaut has mislead the Court.12 WCF claims Argonaut has mislead the court by creating
an "inference" that Argonaut did not receive the "foundational documents."13 Whether
Argonaut received such documents is irrelevant. What is relevant is the fact that this
documentation was never given to the trial court. Argonaut's position is that it was
prejudiced because these documents were never presented to the trial court. Argonaut cannot
control the "inferences" that WCF will make from its statements and a Rule 11(h) motion
cannot be granted to correct inferences. The trial court never considered these documents so
this Court cannot consider them when determining if the trial court abused its discretion.
Appellate Courts may "weigh only those facts and legal arguments preserved ... in the trial
court record."14 These "foundational documents" were never authenticated, never presented
to the trial court, and were never part of the trial court's record.
WCF also claims Argonaut is seeking to impose a duty on the trial court to
"unilaterally raise issues."15 The trial court has a duty to follow the Rules of Evidence16 and

ll

WCF's Response Brief, pp. 30-31.

n

Id.

u

See WCF's Reply In Support of Plaintiffs' Appellees' Rule 11(h) Petition, pp. 2-3.

l4

See Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah App. 1991).

l5

WCF's Reply In Support of Plaintiffs' Appellees' Rule 11(h) Petition, p. 7.

16

Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states "[t]hese rules govern proceedings in
the courts of this State." The Advisory Committee Note also states that "Rule 101 adopts a
general policy making the Rules of Evidence applicable in all instances in courts of the state
4

require that evidence in support of a judgment be properly authenticated.17 The trial court
failed to follow the Rules of Evidence and entered a judgment with no evidence to support
it. Argonaut's due process rights were violated because theile was no evidence properly
presented to the trial court to support the judgment and because Argonaut was never given
an opportunity to rebut the evidence before the trial court.
WCF has sought to supplement the record on appeal thrpugh a motion based on Rule
11(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 18 Through thi^ motion it seeks to add these
"foundational documents" into the record on appeal. This motibn should not be granted and
this Court cannot consider these documents. 19 Rule 11(h) doe$ not permit the introduction
of new evidence into the record.20 The record on appeal) without the "foundational
documents" accurately reflects the "original papers and exhibit^ filed in the trial court."21 The
record should not be supplemented as there is no error or omijssion in the record. The trial
court entered judgment without any proper evidence of damages. Again, the only support

...." (emphasis added).
17

See Rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

n

See WCF's Rule 11(h) Petition to Modify and Supplement the Record on Appeal.

19

For a more complete discussion on the improper nkture of WCF's Rule 11(h)
motions, see Argonaut's Objection to Plaintiffs'/Appellees' Rul^ 11(h) Petition to Modify and
Supplement the Record on Appeal.
20

O/swz, 8 1 5 P . 2 d a t l 3 5 9 .

21

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 11(a).
5

provided to the trial court was two pages with little to no detail.22 The evidence provided to
the trial court was accepted without foundation or any attestation as to its accuracy or
validity. In reviewing the trial court's action, this Court cannot consider the new evidence
WCF seeks to introduce, appendices 8 and 9 of WCF's Response Brief, or any references to
these documents. The trial court's judgment is not supported by the evidence. The trial court
cannot simply accept one party's claim of damages without conducting a hearing or requiring
proof of damages.
In order to meet the requirements of due process, Argonaut must be afforded a
hearing. This hearing should be before the Labor Commission, as it has exclusive jurisdiction
to determine workers' compensation benefits.23 "District courts have no jurisdiction
whatsoever over cases that fall within in the purview of the Workers' Compensation Act."24
In the alternative, a hearing should have been held before the trial court. WCF must lay a
foundation and authenticate all the documents that support its claim to damages, and
Argonaut must be afforded the opportunity to rebut WCF's claim. WCF must present its
evidence to the trial court, not the opposing party. WCF claims that Argonaut had an

22

R. 1514 and 1518

23

See Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 34A-2-407(ll)(a)(2002); Working RX, Inc. v. Workers'
Compensation Fund, 2007 UT App 376, 173 P.3d 853; and Stokes v. Flanders, 970 P.2d
1260 (Utah 1998).
2A

Sheppick v. Albertson 's, Inc., 922 P.2d 769,773 (Utah 1996). See also Morrill v. J.&
M Constr. Co., 635 P.2d 88, 89 (Utah 1981) and Bryan v. Utah InVl, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah
1975).
6

opportunity to object to the evidence because Argonaut received the "foundational
documents."25 Argonaut cannot object to evidence that is notj presented to the trial court.
Until evidence is presented to the trial court, there is nothing to which a party can object.
Argonaut's due process rights were violated. The fact that WCJ7 now seeks to introduce the
real evidence is an admission on their part that there was not sufficient evidence to support
the trial court's judgment.
D.

Argonaut Timely Objected to the Amount of pamages

WCF also argues that Argonaut's right of due process |was not violated due to the
"simple fact" Argonaut never objected to the amount of damages before the entry of
judgment.26 The simple fact is that Argonaut did object.27 jEven if Argonaut did not
specifically use the word "damages" in its objections, it wa^ one of the obvious issues
remaining before the trial court. Argonaut asked the court to interpret the insurance contract
that has never been considered in this case because it would directly affect the amount of
damages. Even with numerous objections, the trial court still refused to hold a hearing to
determine damages or any other issues. Due process rights are not measured by an
opportunity to object, but an opportunity to meaningfully respond.28 Due process requires
that Argonaut be given a hearing on damages.
25

See Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Appellees' Rule 1 l(|h) Petition, pp. 2-3, and 6.

26

Response Brief of Workers Compensation Fund, p. 34

21

SeeR. 1334-1341, 1448-1449, and 1454-1455.

n

See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333.
7

WCF's brief only addresses the objections prior to the entry of judgment.29 This
implies that Argonaut cannot object to the judgment after it has been entered. Rules 59 and
60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allow for objections after judgment has been entered.
Argonaut timely filed an objection after the entry ofjudgment.30 The trial court should have
allowed a hearing on damages after this objection. However, this objection was also
overruled in violation of Argonaut's due process rights.31 The trial court's repeated refusal
to conduct a hearing or transfer the case to the Labor Commission was an abuse of discretion.
II.

THE INSURANCE CONTRACTS BETWEEN WADMAN CORP. AND
ARGONAUT HAVE NOT BEEN CONSIDERED IN THIS CASE
Not once has the entire insurance contract or contracts between Argonaut and

Wadman Corp. been considered in this case. The trial court erred when it found that the
"Utah Supreme Court had conclusively ruled on all issues in the case."32 Also, WCF's
contentions that all of the terms of the insurance contract are set by statute and that all of the
terms were before this Court are without merit.33

29

See WCF's Response Brief, pp. 29-34.

30

SeeR. 1519-1520.

31

& R . 1533.

32

R. 1476.

32

See WCF's Response Brief, pp. 24-29.
8

A.

The Supreme Court did not Consider the Insurance Contract between
Argonaut and Wadman Corp.

This Court did not consider the all the insurance contract^ in this case. The Court only
considered the OCIP Manual and recognized that while the 0(tlP Manual was a part of the
insurance contract, it "cis not intended to provide coverage interpretations' and the' terms and
conditions of the policies alone govern how coverage is applied.'"34 The Court also
recognized that not all relevant portions of the contract were presented.35
WCF claims that Argonaut is bringing "repetitious contentions ... upon the same
proposition in the same case."36 Argonaut is not trying to litigate the same proposition again
in this case. It only seeks one chance to be heard on the issues. This Court previously found
that no contract existed between Argonaut and Iverson.37 It al^o determined that Wadman
Corp. was the statutory employer of Mr. Searle and that Argonaut should pay for Mr. Searle's
I
benefits pursuant to its contract with Wadman Corp.38 All Argonaut is now seeking from this
Court is an opportunity to have the complete contract between Wadman Corp. and Argonaut
interpreted, and the amount of benefits due determined in fair and procedurally proper

34

Wadman, 2009 UT at f 18, R. 1306.

3

7</. at1U3;R. 1304.

36

WCF's Response Brief, p. 25 (citing Arnica Mutual Insurance Company v. Schettler,
768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah App. 1989)).
"'Wadman, 2009 UT at^fl8, R. 1306.
38

/datf40,R. 1313.

manner. These are distinct and separate issues than those previously decided by this Court.
The law of the case doctrine is inapplicable.
This Court has ruled there is no coverage for Iverson because they never enrolled.40
Thus the OCIP workers' compensation policy does not apply. It was Wadman's and
Iverson's negligence in not enrolling that brought about this outcome. If Wadman Corp. is
covered for this loss caused by its negligence, it is likely through its general liability policy.
The trial court must determine if deductibles and other requirements of this policy have been
met. Wadman Corp. is the responsible party as the statutory employer. Because of issues like
these all of the policy contracts between Wadman Corp. and Argonaut must be presented in
this case. Argonaut has attempted to present the contracts and allow their terms to be
considered by the court,41 but the trial court refused.42 The actual terms of the insurance
policies between Wadman Corp. and Argonaut were not required for this Court to determine
that Wadman Corp. was the statutory employer of Mr. Searle.43 However, on remand, all the
insurance policies would have to be presented to the trial court in order to determine the

39

Standard practice when there are two policies in effect is to split payment pro rata.
See 44 Am Jur 2d §§ 1781 and 1782.
m

ld. atffi[18and 20, R. 1306 and 1307.

4l

See R. 1334-1341, 1448-1449, and 1454-1455.

42
43

f e R . 1451-1452 and 1476.

See Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 34A-2-103(7)(a)(ii) (employer considered statutory
employer if it procures any work to be done, retains supervision or control, and this work is
part or process of the business of the employer).
10

extent of Argonaut's liability, if any, for the claims of Mr. Searje against Wadman. The trial
court would not be reversing this Court if it considered the insurance contracts as WCF
contends.44 Instead, in order for the trial court to "take action consistent"45 with Wadman, it
must consider the insurance contracts between Wadman Corp. dnd Argonaut. Without doing
so the benefits due to Mr. Searle cannot be determined and this (Court's holding in Wadman
cannot be implemented. The trial court erred in not allowing 4 proceeding to interpret the
contracts between Wadman Corp. and Argonaut.
WCF also argues that Argonaut's contention that the insurance policies need to be
interpreted is without merit because it has never "proffered to yCF, the Supreme Court, or
the trial court the contractual language it claims would limit coverage ...."46 The contracts
between Wadman Corp. and Argonaut were never at issue in this case until this Court found
that Wadman Corp. was the statutory employer of Mr. Searle. It has never been procedurally
appropriate for Argonaut to proffer such evidence in this case. Argonaut would have gladly
offered the insurance contracts had the trial court allowed it.

"R. 1349.
45

Wadman, 2009 UT at f4L

46

Plaintiffs' Response Brief, p. 24.
11

B.

The Workers' Compensation Act does not set all terms for all Workers5
Compensation Insurance Policies

WCF argues that the Workers' Compensation Act provides all the provisions for all
the workers' compensation insurance policies in Utah.47 It states the "coverage terms are not
left to chance or negotiation."48 This argument is without merit as the Workers'
Compensation Act only provides a framework for insurance policies.
If WCF's argument is correct, then there is no need for any insurance policy between
an employer and an insurance carrier. If every provision is set by statute, then the need for
a contract is moot. Obviously, this is not the case. The Workers' Compensation Act provides
a framework for insurance contracts. It does not dictate all the terms and exclusions of
contracts. While it may be true that the Workers' Compensation Act requires that insurance
providers cover statutory employees if they are injured by accident arising out of and in the
course of employment,49 the Act does not require insurance providers to cover every injury
to every employee.50 Further, Argonaut has never argued that the policies between Wadman
Corp. and Argonaut would exclude Mr. Searle because he was a statutory employee. If
WCF's argument is correct, then coverage is required with no limitations, or requirements
for every employee. There would be no need for the Labor Commission if this were the case.
41

Id. at 25-27.

A

Hd. at 26.

49

See Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 34A-2-401(l).

50

See e.g. McKay Dee Hospital v. Industrial Cornm'n of Utah, 598 P.2d 375, 377
(Utah 1979).
12

There are many other parts of the policy that could possibly limit or eliminate Argonaut's
liability besides the status of Mr. Searle as a statutory employee. Every insurance policy
contains requirements that the insured must meet in order for poverage to apply and every
insurance policy has endorsements that modify the requirements of the policy. For example,
a policy may contain self-insurance provisions that would require Wadman Corp. to pay a
certain amount before coverage applies. These must be considered in order to determine the
extent of Argonaut's liability. Thus, all the policies between Wfadman Corp. and Argonaut
must be put into evidence, not just the OCIP Manual. The Workers' Compensation Act does
not dictate all terms for all policies in Utah. The usual procedures for determining workers'
compensation benefits have been completely ignored throughout this case. This Court must
reverse the trial court to ensure that proper procedures are followed.
Also, WCF's reliance on Touchard v. La-Z-Boy, 2006 ijT 71, 148 P.3d 94551 that
benefits are "beyond the reach of contract"52 is misplaced.53 Touchard and the case it relies
upon, Retherford v. A T&T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, both deal
with the tort of wrongful termination. These cases deal with employment contracts. When
the court states that it places workers' compensation beyond the rpach of contract, it is saying
that an employee cannot waive his or her rights to receive workers' compensation benefits
M

WCF's Response Brief mistakenly cites this case as Touchard v. La-Z-Boy, 148 P.3d
545 (Utah 2006). See WCF's Response Brief, pp. v and 27.
52

Touchard v. La-Z-Boy, 2006 UT 7 1 4 16, 148 P-3d 545 (citing Retherford v. AT&T
Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 966 ft. 9 (Utah 1992).
53

See WCF's Response Brief, p. 27.
13

as part of his or her employment contract. These cases have nothing to do with workers'
compensation insurance contracts. These cases have no precedential or persuasive value for
the current case.
III.

ARGONAUT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS FILED TIMELY
The final judgment in this case was not final until February 10, 2010.54 Therefore,

pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), Argonaut had until March 12, 2010.
Argonaut timely filed its notice of appeal on March 8,2010, four days before the deadline.55
Even if the Court considers the January 11, 2010 judgment of the court the final judgment
for purposes of Rule 4(a), Argonaut's notice of appeal is still timely. Argonaut's Objection
to Judgment56 filed January 15, 2010 tolled the time to file the notice of appeal.
A.

Argonaut's Objection to Judgment Should be Treated as a Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59

The substance of Argonaut's Objection to Judgment clearly fulfilled the requirements
of a motion for new trial or amendment ofjudgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.57 This rule allows a trial court to "take additional testimony, amend findings of
fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of

54

R. 1533.

55

R. 1548-1549.

56

R. 1519-1521.

51

See Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983) ("If the
nature of the motion can be ascertained from the substance of the instrument... an improper
caption is not fatal to that motion.").
14

a new judgment."58 Such action is proper by a trial court when there are "[e]xcessive or
inadequate damages," "[insufficiency of the evidence to justify the ... decision," or "[ejrror
in law."59 All three of these grounds are argued in Argonaut's Objection to Judgment and the
trial court's denial of the motion was error. Also, Argonaut did not need to file an affidavit
to argue these grounds, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(c).
Argonaut argued that the damages were excessive whei^i it objected to the award of
administrative costs and prejudgment interest.60 Because these damages were awarded
without an order from the Supreme Court or supported by law, thb damages were given under
prejudice. Thus, the elements of Rule 59(a)(5) are met.
Argonaut also argued that there was insufficient evidence to justify the award.
Argonaut argued that "the Labor Commission would have exclusive jurisdiction over
determining the amount of monies paid."61 There was not enough evidence presented by
WCF to determine the amount of monies that had been paid. WCF's evidence did not show
the date or amount of payments, or even a description of the payments. The evidence
presented to the trial court was wholly insufficient to justify the $790,484.59 award.
Argonaut also argued error in law. Argonaut objected to the judgment because it was
in error. Argonaut argued that the judgment was in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-258

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a).

59

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5)-(7).

60

R. 1519-1520.

61

R. 1520.
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401(2) because the judgment was not against Wadman Corp., Mr. Searle's statutory
employer.62 Argonaut argued that no law allowed prejudgment interest.63 Finally, Argonaut
argued that the judgment violated the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act.64 Thus, the substance of Argonaut's Objection to Judgment was a motion
for new trial or amendment ofjudgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59. The fact that
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 1(a) requires courts to liberally construe the rules also weighs
in favor of treating the Objection to Judgment as a Rule 59 motion. Thus the Objection to
Judgment must be treated as a Rule 59 motion.65
Because Argonaut's Objection to Judgment was really a Rule 59 motion, the time to
file the notice of appeal was tolled until the trial court ruled on the motion. Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure 4(b)( 1 )(C) and (D) provide that if a motion under Rule 59 is filed timely
the time to file a notice of appeal runs from the time the court orders on the motion. A rule
59 motion must be filed within 10 days from the entry of judgment.66 Argonaut filed its
motion four days after the judgment.67 Because Argonaut timely filed a motion under Rule
59, the time to file the notice of appeal was tolled until the trial court issued its order on

62

R. 1519.

63

R. 1520.

"Id. See also Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 34A-2-407(l l)(a).
"'Howard v. Howard, 356 P.2d 275, 276 (Utah 1960).
6G

See Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(b).

67

R. 1478 and 1519.
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February 10, 2010. Thus Argonaut's notice of appeal was filed timely.
B.

Alternatively, the Objection to Judgment should be treated as a Rule
60(b) Motion

If the Court determines that the Objection to Judgment ^as not a motion under Rule
59, it should be treated as a motion for relief from judgment wider Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule requires that such a request be made by motion "within
a reasonable time."68 Argonaut's motion was made four days aft^r the entry ofjudgment and
is therefore reasonable. Rule 60(b) motions should be liberally granted "so that controversies
can be decided on the merits."69 WCF claims that "Argonaut had ample opportunity to raise
its defenses."70 This statement is not true. All of Argonaut's pl^as to the trial court fell on
deaf ears. Argonaut was never given an opportunity to try its defeases on the merits. The trial
court simply accepted the damages set by WCF without questioh or providing Argonaut a
hearing to refute the claim. Argonaut was never given a chaiice to raise any defenses.
Therefore, it would be proper for this Court to treat Argonaut's Objection to Judgment as a
Rule 60(b) motion and reverse the trial court's denial of the motion for an abuse of
discretion. The amount of benefits due to Mr. Searle must be determined on the merits, not
by the unilateral assertions of WCF.

68

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

^Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ^[54, 150 P.3d 480.
70

WCF'S Response Brief, p. 41.
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IV.

THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT INTEREST RATE APPLIES
This case involves the payment of workers' compensation benefits and the interest

rate applicable to such benefits should apply. WCF argues that this case is based on
"reimbursement of the payment of a debt owed by another"71 and that the "damages are based
on an unpaid contractual duty."72 These statements mischaracterize the nature of the dispute.
First, there is no contract between WCF and any defendant named in this case. The
only party WCF has a contract with is Iverson. However, WCF seeks no payment from
them.73 Second, Argonaut was ordered generally by this Court to pay Mr. Searle's workers'
compensation benefits.74 No order as to the amount, including reasonableness or necessity,
was entered. In order to receive interest, WCF now seeks to turn the case from workers'
compensation benefits to contract. If the case is turned into a contract case, then WCF's
payment of workers' compensation benefits becomes an investment with a return on interest.
Argonaut has not been ordered to pay any obligation to WCF by this Court.
To support its claim that Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 applies, WCF relies on Wasatch
MiningCo. v. Crescent Mining Co. ,24P. 586 (Utah 1890). WCF's broad reading of this case
would suggest that interest should be allowed on any debt. However, a workers'

7

7d. atp.48.

12

Id. at p. 49.

73

WCF did not voluntarily pay benefits to Mr. Searle out of the goodness of its heart,
but because it believed it would have liability through this contract.
Wadman, 2009 UT atflO, R. 1313.
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compensation claimant, or an insurance provider that voluntarily pays money to a claimant
before the Labor Commission determines what benefits are owed, are not the type of debtors
contemplated by the situation presented to the court in Wasatch.y In addition, this Court has
questioned the broad application of Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. Ih Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 525 fn. 13 (Utah 1994), this Court
stated that the "plain language of section 15-1-1 seems to indicate that the section was
intended to apply only to a loan or forbearance' of 'money, gfx>ds, or chose in action.'"
"This court has previously expressed the view that... section 15-1-1(2) does not necessarily
even apply in all contract cases."76 The plain language of the statute prohibits its application
in this case as WCF has not provided a loan or forbearance, but Voluntarily paid benefits to
Mr. Searle.
To further support its argument, WCF asserts it a has ia contract claim because
Wadman Corp. assigned its claims to WCF.77 However, Wadnian Corp.'s claims against
Argonaut have never been filed or preserved for this appeal. "In order to preserve an issue
for appeal the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has
an opportunity to rule on that issue. Thus, the issue must be timely and specifically raised,

15

Compare Whitney v. Faulkner, 2004 UT 52, \ 17, 95 P.3d 270 ("a garnishee's
obligations ... are simply not the same as those incurred by the type of debtor contemplated
by the rule of Wasatch Mining."),
'"Wilcox v. Anchor Water Co., 2007 UT 39, f45, 164 P.3d $53.
WCF's Response Brief, p. 48.
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and supported by evidence or relevant legal authority."78 Wadman Corp. 's breach of contract
claim was never presented to the trial court. In fact, Wadman Corp. has never brought a
breach of contract claim against Argonaut. Wadman Corp. attempted to bring a breach of
contract claim by seeking leave to amend its answer to include a cross claim.79 However,
leave was never granted and Wadman Corp.'s motion to amend was denied as moot.80 The
trial court never had an opportunity to rule on the alleged breach of contract claim. Wadman
Corp. cannot assign to WCF a contract claim it was never allowed to bring and WCF cannot
for the first time on appeal claim that it has a contract claim through Wadman Corp. There
is no contract claim that would take this case out of the Workers' Compensation Act and
make Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 applicable.
WCF also contends that prejudgment interest at 10% is appropriate because the
interest was calculated "with mathematical accuracy."81 However, in order for "damages to
be calculable with mathematical certainty, they must be ascertained in accordance with fixed
rules of evidence and known standards of value, which the court... must follow in fixing the
amount, rather than be guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed

n

Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App. 139, ^[24, 233 P.3d 836 (internal citations
omitted).
79

R. 1103-1104.

80

R.1284 pp. 34:16-35:16.

8l

WCF's Response Brief, p. 47.
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,..."82 No rules of evidence were followed in the trial court. The trial court entered judgment
based on a cursory computer printout81 that was admitted without foundation as to accuracy
or validity. This printout was not authenticated pursuant to Riile 901 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. The printout provides no detail on when payments weye made or for what purpose.
Argonaut was not allowed to challenge the claim to interest. The contract that allegedly
allows WCF to receive interest was never put in evidence. There tnay be an interest provision
that applies, but it is impossible to tell because the trial court neiver allowed the contract to
be presented. The trial court completely ignored the rules of evidence and entered interest
based on its best judgment. Prejudgment interest is inappropriate because the interest was not
calculated with mathematical accuracy. This case involves workers' compensation benefits
and must be governed by the Workers' Compensation Act.
This case is a dispute about workers' compensation benefits. The Workers'
i

Compensation Act applies, including its interest provisions. The Labor Commission has
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the benefits due to Mr. Searl^ and when those benefits
were due.84 As a result of this exclusive jurisdiction the interest provision in Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-420(3) applies to the benefits due in this case. WCF has npt refuted that the interest
rate provided by the Workers' Compensation Act should apply to post-judgment instead of

n

Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown, and Gunnell, 784 ^.2d 475,483 (Utah App.
1989) (internal citations omitted).
83

R. 1517-1518.

u

See Sheppick, 922 P.2d at 773.
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Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4.
V.

JUDGMENT SHOULD BE ENTERED AGAINST WADMAN CORP.
The Utah State Legislature has set out the procedure to determine when an employee

is entitled to workers' compensation benefits and who is responsible to pay for those benefits
in the Workers' Compensation Act. This procedure ensures that employers and their
insurance carriers are only liable for compensable injuries and that employees receive all the
compensation they deserve. However, any concern for following the proper procedure was
completely abandoned by the trial court. Usually, the Labor Commission decides if there is
a compensable injury.85 Then the Labor Commission determines which employer and which
insurance carrier is liable for the benefits. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(2) provides that the
responsibility to pay benefits is "on the employer and the employer's insurance carrier." This
Court has determined that Wadman Corp. was the statutory employer of Mr. Searle.86
Therefore judgment must be entered against Wadman Corp. pursuant to Utah Code
Ann.34A-2-401(2). Just because Wadman Corp. paid premiums for workers' compensation
insurance does not mean it escapes all liability under the Workers' Compensation Act.87 The
Labor Commission must now determine the nature Mr. Searle's injuries and the benefits that
are due from Wadman Corp. and Argonaut.
The trial court skipped steps in the proper procedure for determining liability for
*5See Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 34A-2-401(l).
*6Wadman, 2009 UT atf33, R. 1311.
87

Wadman Corp. did not pay premiums for Mr. Searle until he was enrolled after the accident.
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workers' compensation benefits when it entered judgment directly and solely against
Argonaut. The procedures are set to provide regularity and predictability for the courts and
the parties. A court cannot simply skip procedures as the trial qourt did in the instant case.
Wadman Corp. is the statutory employer of Mr. Searle and as ^uch is liable along with its
insurance carrier for benefits. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to
include Wadman Corp. in its judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's entry of
judgment and require a hearing on damages where evidence of the policy can be
presented or allow the Labor Commission to determine the benefits due to Mr. Searle.
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